Despite a centralized political system, nation-wide legal reforms, and similar high housing demand pressures, property rights have evolved differently in Vietnam's two leading cities Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City during the transition period. Using ethnographic fieldwork and a hedonic price model, the study shows that the two land and housing markets price tenure ambiguity differently. The different price structures indicate the importance of norms, as socially constructed by local political interests and culture, in the efficacy of land title regularization programs.
INTRODUCTION:
For decades, international development agencies and governments have pursued land tenure regularization projects in hopes of bolstering private property rights enough to unleash wealth generating investment into land and housing markets. Their record of success has been mixed and often criticized (Durand-Lasserve & Royston, 2002; Field & Torero, 2004; FirminSellers & Sellers, 1999; Payne, 2001; Woodruff, 2001 ). However, the support for these programs by many has not flagged but only strengthened in recent years (deSoto, 2000) 1 . Previous scholarship has tried to account for the mixed outcomes by debating the relationship between tenure security and legal titles. In some contexts, the impact of title programs may be limited because households invest in property without title in hopes of having stronger claims for tenure later (Razzaz, 1993) . Alternatively, it could be that the efficacy of title is unrealized without also strengthening legal enforcement and financial institutions (McKechnie, 2005) . Others point out that in some established communities, the untitled might actually feel quite secure about their housing tenure but still do not choose to participate in the real estate market (Lanjouw & Levy, 2002) . Most developing and transition countries exhibit a range of title formalization and market development even without fully developed courts and financial institutions (Li, 1999; Zhu, 2002) . Irregularity of titles appears to be a hindrance in some markets more than others.
The classic theory for explaining the evolution of legal private property rights systems counted the costs and benefits (Demsetz, 1967) . The market would create the demand for title if a sufficiently large net economic gain could be generated by such a change. However, there is still much that is left unexplained by this general framework. In particular, the mechanisms by which society counts the costs and benefits and the form that new property rights take as a result have been left unanswered (Merrill, 2002) .
In trying to understand why some societies are more responsive to title reforms, more recent institutional economics scholarship is helpful in indicating that when economics focuses on the enforcement of rules and laws as shaping behavior, the underlying reason is left unrecognized. Micro-foundation institutions such as norms, beliefs, and culture shape the motivation for following rule-based institutions; that is the reason the enforcers enforce the rules (Greif, 2006) . Inter-disciplinary scholars have used empirical cases to identify institutional factors that can make important differences in property rights outcomes such as local politics and culture (Ellickson, 1991; Levmore, 2002; Ostrom, 1990) .
Sociologists have long theorized and debated how politics and culture work together in the process of socially constructing economic institutions. Political power works to influence the shape of social structures for its own interests (Bourdieu, 1977; Burawoy, 2001) . While structures are external to the agents, coming in the form of laws, policies, network relationships, etc. they must also be internalized cognitively by the agents and habitualized into routine practices to the point that they are made normal and embedded into the institutional fabric of society. Therefore, agents play an integral role through their repeated interactions in constructing and reproducing these external structures. The institutions are internalized and externalized. There is perennial debate as to how much agency exists within the structures, but agreement that rather than viewing society as a rational actor that chooses the most efficient institutional design, economic institutions such as property rights are built through this social construction process (Berger & Luckman, 1967; Bourdieu, 2005; .
In order to better account for the institutional outcomes, case studies have been used to detail the social construction process of electricity pricing , the high tech-industry in Silicon Valley (Saxenian, 1996) , and the housing industry in modern France (Bourdieu, 2005) . These studies focus on the evolution of an industry and its structure. While institutional factors like social norms, culture, and political economy have a lot of intuitive resonance, it is usually more difficult to analyze their concrete impacts on market transactions. They do not usually lend themselves to statistical analysis. This study takes advantage of the opportunity to compare whether the housing markets in two cities in Vietnam, Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City, with purportedly widely different social norms around profiting from property and legal formalism, price shades of legal tenure differently.
Vietnam is an interesting case for the literature for several reasons. One, while Vietnam has often been cited as not having made appropriate institutional reforms for private property rights (Heritage Foundation, 2004; IMF, 2000) it has developed widespread and rapidly growing private property markets. Second, while the legal framework and administrative structures are homogeneous across the nation, property rights have evolved differently between its two major cities during the 1993-2004 period: Hanoi in the north and Ho Chi Minh City (HCMC) in the south. While both cities faced rapidly growing housing demand pressures which would impel a change towards private property rights institutions as previous scholarship has indicated, this paper argues that differences in social norms about property and the law, as socially constructed by local politics and culture, account for the observed linguistic differences and market valuation of newly formed private property rights. Relative to Ho Chi Minh City, Hanoi's social norms and more rigid bureaucracy led to a real estate market which was slower to adopt new legal terms for property rights and penalized properties with ambiguous property rights status. Meanwhile, Ho Chi Minh City's market rapidly evolved new terms for property rights in order to capitalize on the latest formal legal changes. It also allowed properties with more ambiguous tenure to still come to market because a range of property rights could still be enforced through alternative institutions allowed by its particular social norms and more flexible government bureaucracy.
In presenting the empirical evidence, this paper first introduces how private property rights reforms were implemented by the Vietnamese government. Next, it discusses differences in politics and culture between Vietnam's northern and southern regions according to key informant interviews and the area studies literature as well as hypotheses about how these differences should affect the operationalization of these new rights. Then, the paper applies hedonic price models to statistically analyze how the newly emerged property markets of Hanoi and HCMC value private property rights. Finally the paper discusses the implications these findings have for policy and academic discourses.
PROPERTY RIGHTS REFORMS AND INSTITUTIONS IN VIETNAM
Policy advisors have warned that Vietnam does not have the right institutions for the protection of private property, namely clear legislation, title registration, and capable court systems. However, Vietnamese people have been buying and selling their rights to residential property in the rapidly expanding real estate markets.
2 Of course these property rights claims are not valid without legitimate enforcement institutions (Cole & Grossman, 2002) . But, there can be a great amount of diversity in where and what form economic institutions take in specific contexts. This section first identifies the property rights institutions that exist in transitional Vietnam.
Before the transition, Vietnam's government planned where people were employed, housed, and received food and social services through a household registration system. The bureaucracy involved with this system meant that household tenancy was well documented when Vietnam began its major economic reforms in 1986. With the introduction of the 1993 Land Law, a major change in property rights was allowed in this communist nation. The state still retained ownership of all land but a private person or entity could now possess, transfer, and mortgage use rights to a land parcel for a specific period of time, essentially functioning like leasehold rights found in the U.K. and Hong Kong.
Legally, urban households must obtain a Building Ownership and Land Use Certificate (BOLUC) which combines homeownership with the land use right into one legal document. Also known as the "pink certificate" for its color, the BOLUC is the equivalent to having a fully titled private residential property. However, since its introduction, less than 25% of the houses had obtained them by 2001 (Dang & Palmkvist, 2001) . 3 The reasons why so few properties have the BOLUC are many.
In some cases, a house's lack of title could be a reflection of being caught in a bureaucratic limbo for missing some of the legal papers needed to document tenancy or the local ward or district government's limited administrative capacity to issue them. Meanwhile, because of the fees and time involved in obtaining the BOLUC and the tax liabilities incurred with ownership, some buyers and sellers prefer to transact without it. Alternatively, others pay property related taxes and fees and have the wards notarize the transactions which increase the legitimacy of ownership claims but still do not register for title.
Another reason why one might not have received the BOLUC despite applying for it and possessing all the necessary legal papers is that any lingering property disputes over ownership, boundaries, etc. must be resolved before they are issued (Gillespie, 1999a) . This is an important point since property claims are only truly property rights if they are enforced (Cole & Grossman, 2002) and so the true test of a claim being a right is shown by the way disputes are resolved. Like other centrally planned countries, Vietnam has an elaborate government bureaucracy involved in many aspects of household economic life that is involved in settling disputes. However, compared to other Asian communist states, Vietnam is characterized by a high amount of discretion at the lower levels of government (Fforde & de Vylder, 1996; Gainsborough, 2002; Leaf, 1996) . For example, in HCMC, the majority of land and housing disputes are handled by neighborhood communities and local bureaucrats (see Figure 1) . The first and lowest institution for handling many kinds of disputes is the residential block committees, the to dan pho. Outsiders are often surprised by the extent to which neighbors in Vietnam can weigh in on what would be deemed private household affairs in other contexts. But, the attitude is to resolve disputes as quickly as possible and locally through arbitration in order to avoid more official involvement of higher levels of government. If the to dan pho cannot resolve a dispute, the ward may get involved.
[Place Figure 1 around here] In 2001, there were 238 urban wards in HCMC with on average roughly 4,000 households in each ward (please see Appendix). Many ward offices have bureaucrats designated to deal exclusively with land and housing issues in their ward. Ward officials estimate that 30-50% of the disputes they hear annually concern land and housing issues and that they can resolve roughly 70% of them. One ward president who presides over a ward on the city's outskirts explained in an interview that the wards not only use their own records to check ownership but that they often also know who the people are because they attend each other's weddings, anniversaries, and memorial services. Disputes unresolved at the ward level of government may gain a hearing with the district government's land and housing departments and civil courts. District courts in HCMC hear about 600 housing cases a year and approximately one-third of these are referred on appeal to city courts taking an average of one to three years to be resolved (Gillespie, 1999a) . While similar data is unavailable for Hanoi, government officials in the land law area confirm that neighborhood block groups and ward governments arbitrate cases in Hanoi as well. The availability of alternative property rights enforcement instituitons also helps to explain why households are slow to obtain the BOLUC. However, possession of the BOLUC would provide less risk of title disputes for which a buyer might be willing to pay more.
Thus, in Vietnam one can have state-sanctioned property rights that are not necessarily enforced by the courts and registration institutions which are the focus of international development projects. Instead, property rights enforcement occurs at a variety of levels of civil and state institutions and ranges from negotiation to increasingly formal legal means. In particular, the widespread use of the neighborhood block groups and ward governments allow for discretionary latitude in the enforcement of property rights. Other studies in Asia also suggest that property rights enforcement and dispute resolution may be administered through existing state organizations which may not have been formally assigned the duty by law but effectively enforce them (Gillespie, 1999b; Leaf, 1994) . One can see that given Vietnam's institutional endowments of well-documented tenancy and an extensive, decentralized bureaucracy, these alternative registration and enforcement mechanisms are the least costly way to enforce the new property rights, at least in the short-term.
THE POLITICS AND CULTURE AROUND PROPERTY IN THE NORTHERN AND SOUTHERN REGIONS OF VIETNAM
As explained above, decentralized government bureaucracies can exercise discretion in law enforcement. While the laws and government structure are identical throughout the whole nation, any researcher in Vietnam cannot escape the often mentioned sentiments about differences between northerners and southerners. This is not surprising given its political history but the differences are also cited as deep seeded cultural ones. This section summarizes some of the differences in politics and social norms around property between Vietnam's northern and southern regions as described by the secondary literature and interviews with government officials, business leaders, and citizens in both regions in 1997, 2000-2001, and 2003 4 . With its history as the epicenter of the communist revolution and state power, it is not surprising that northerners are generally known as being more rigid about regulations and that the north is a more difficult place to conduct private business (Dapice, CNguyen, Pham, & Bui, 2004) . According to real estate development firms interviewed in HCMC who investigated setting up shop in the north, Hanoi does not have comparable open entry into the market. Although exact figures are not available, one developer estimates that the state directly controls land development of about 30% of the parcels and 50% of the developable land area in HCMC whereas it controls 90% of the parcels and almost all of the land area in Hanoi. The most striking evidence that land supply and development is overwhelmingly dominated by political elites and state-owned companies is that only a handful of private development firms exist in Hanoi. Constricting land supply typically induces higher house prices (Dowall & Landis, 1982) . Political economy theory is especially helpful in explaining the situation in Hanoi. Since political elites can dominate market share through control of land supply, it is in their best interest to keep prices high through enforcement of the formal property rights laws not only for state legitimacy but personal gain. Thus, the political interests to maintain strict adherence to rules and the social norms about following rules are not only complementary but reinforcing.
In contrast, although the highest positions in city government are appointed by the communist party in Hanoi, the bureaucracy in HCMC has generally been more pragmatic than legalistic (Turley & Womack, 1998) . For example, HCMC experimented with pilot programs such as the one-stop office to rationalize and expedite procedures for obtaining land development permits instead of having applicants try to negotiate the maze of multiple bureaus. This is not surprising considering that social attitudes are generally more lax about formal rules and prone to experimenting which complements the entrepreneurial culture of Ho Chi Minh City. Accordingly, hundreds of private land and housing development firms have formed in HCMC within the first decade of transition (JBIC, 1999) and entrepreneurs interviewed confirm open entry into the market, however imperfectly competitive it is. As one private real estate developer related, "The biggest difference between the north and south is social perception…in the south you may tax profits but the attitude is 'good for you' whereas in the north they have a criminal atmosphere." The south has more of a consumer culture and the concept of advertising has been adopted more readily, fueling market demand, whereas people in the north are characterized as savers. 5 The social norms about economic transactions typically involve less ideology about dual-pricing and stigmatizing profit-making and consumption. Meanwhile in interviews with law firms, one lawyer related that there were only three lawyers specializing in real estate in all of Ho Chi Minh City in 2001. Real estate developers related to me that it is rare to use lawyers in the south whereas it is more common in the north. The consumer culture in the south plus a greater readiness to transact with strangers and to make new social networks has helped to expand both supply and demand in the south which has translated into a larger market and greater competition. Market competition should also induce lower house prices relative to an oligopolistic situation like Hanoi's housing market. Furthermore, there is a pervasive norm in the south to be relaxed about following rules which complements the way the bureaucracy operates in the south. And so it is not surprising that such a large percentage of property disputes are settled by arbitration through neighborhood block groups and ward levels of government.
There could be several reasons why different regions of Vietnam have different cultural attitudes towards private property. .Differences between regions in regards to property relations became pronounced during the French colonial period when private ownership, the growth of markets, and a private property register were more established in the south during the 1890s (Wiegersma, 1988) . During the 1950s, before the revolution, land tenure varied greatly between the three regions with the south having absentee landlords while central Vietnam had more communal land ownership and the north pursued five waves of land reform, expropriating land from nearly 58% of the population (Moise, 1983) .
Beyond path dependency discussions, some researchers point to contemporary Ho Chi Minh City's government leaders as being the vanguards of reform (Turley & Womack, 1998) within the country out of sheer economic necessity. Or, that northern city bureaucrats still do not know how to work productively with private business (Dapice, CNguyen et al., 2004) . Others take issue with this characterization when HCMC government bureaus and elites have also exhibited predatory actions towards business like in the rest of the country (Gainsborough, 2003) . This viewpoint actually coincides with the assessment of institutions advocating free market reforms (Heritage Foundation, 2004; IMF, 2000) that all of Vietnam has not implemented reforms sufficiently. However, these debates do not address the core point of this research which focuses on the economic behavior of people in the markets in Hanoi and HCMC rather than either the formal government policies or bureaus. Several Vietnam scholars refer to a spontaneous, bottom-up process that started practical transition in Vietnam (Fforde & de Vylder, 1996; Gainsborough, 2003) . They are less clear on exactly how they have socially reconstructed property rights and operationalized them. The people in the market of course are affected by their interactions with state bureaucracies which enforce property rights but these bureaucrats themselves are a part of the social reconstruction process which may vary according to the local social norms about property.
I hypothesize that while there is also corruption and predatory behavior of the local government and elites in HCMC, the political economy and culture is such that compared to Hanoi, they interact more productively with private businesses 6 . I think the evidence is clear when almost no private real estate firms have been able to form in Hanoi while there are hundreds in HCMC even though market demand is even higher in Hanoi because of the supply constraints. From a neoclassical economics viewpoint, one would have thought the profit margin would provide more than enough incentive for private firms to form in the north (Dapice, Nguyen, Pham, & Bui, 2004) . Some of my case firms tried but they report not just their perceptions about the north but the impossibility of their efforts.
The way to tell if there are significant differences in norms about property rights between Hanoi and HCMC is to look for evidence. My study takes advantage of a unique opportunity in the Vietnamese transition to examine market data and find whether the societies in the two cities price property rights differently. In summary, the differences in political interests and culture would suggest that property rights might be operationalized differently in Hanoi and HCMC. We would expect that despite lower median incomes, house prices will be higher in Hanoi because of the constricted supply through more restrictive regulatory practices and monopoly of land supply by political elites. We would also expect the Hanoian market to value titled property rights more than the south because of the greater levels of enforcement whereas the south should be more lenient to alternative forms of documenting property rights. The next section investigates the empirical evidence to see if this is the case.
EMPIRICAL FINDINGS (a) Differences in language and house prices
Given the differences between the politics and culture in the north and the south, this paper investigated whether there were differences in how private house sellers in Hanoi and HCMC operationalize the new private property rights instituted by the government. Many variables are held constant since the two cities are in the same country with a uniform legal and government administrative structure and because both markets expanded rapidly during the same time period. For data, this study turned to where market transactions begin: the private listings of houses for sale in the local newspaper. Using issues of Mua va Ban (literally translated "Buy and Sell"), a popular classified advertisement newspaper that has both a Hanoi and HCMC edition, I culled advertisements from the March-June 2004 issues 7 . These advertisements contain an amount of detailed information that is rare for most developing countries and makes it possible to apply a hedonic price model. I was able to have the General Statistics Office reparse the 1999 census data down to the ward level so that I could attach neighborhood characteristics. I selected all ads that at least listed a price, the house size, and the name of its ward (Please see appendix for more details). Table 1 presents a comparison of descriptive statistics for the houses on the market in Hanoi and HCMC. HCMC is a larger city and its housing market is also bigger as we can see in the number of observations recorded for each city. In reviewing the amenities of the houses listed, we do not find major differences in the quality of housing being offered for sale between the two cities. However, the price per square meter of housing in Hanoi is more expensive than in HCMC even though Hanoi's median household income level is only about two-thirds of HCMC's. Given that the median size of a house's footprint is similar in both cities, we can see that housing in Hanoi is much denser than in HCMC. The high prices and density further suggest the land supply constraints in Hanoi's housing markets discussed earlier.
[Place Table 1 around here] One of the most interesting aspects of this data source is that of the 5162 observations, nearly all of them make reference to some kind of property rights status. But, despite a national legal framework, the property rights terms commonly used by house sellers in Hanoi differ from those used in HCMC. As explained in the previous section, having the BOLUC or "pink certificate" was the most recent and secure form of tenure and therefore it should be the most valuable form of property right in the housing market. Having a pink certificate also means the seller has invested time and money in obtaining the title which should be compensated in the sales price. Certainly, transferring ownership of property with a pink certificate is easier since they are only issued if there are no outstanding property disputes. However, while the government has decreed that every house must obtain a pink certificate, most properties do not have it.
In HCMC, there are two property rights terms most commonly used to refer to formal title: "Chu quyen tu nhan" loosely translated "ownership certificate" and "Chu quyen hong" or "pink certificate". A previous study found that in the early years of the real estate market, 1998-2001, "ownership certificate" was the more common term used in advertisements (Kim, 2004) . It was assumed the lister mean they had the BOLUC but it could have also included older certificates or other papers. However, starting in 2002, "pink certificate" became the more commonly used term in the market. It is less ambiguous which document the seller has and advertises the "highest value legal document" explains a Vietnamese property lawyer. As seen in Table 1 , 69.3% of the listed properties claim possession of the pink certificate.
What is even more fascinating is that Hanoians use a different term for property rights: so do, which can be translated as "red certificate". These documents existed since 1994 and certify an occupant's right to use the land on which the house is located. By 2004, the latest regulations required a pink certificate to combine house ownership and land use right into one document for urban areas while the red certificate is still used for agricultural land. Key informants confirm that Hanoians are referring to the BOLUC when they use the older term, giving further indication of the slower pace of change in the north. Interestingly, unlike the HCMC ads, many sellers in Hanoi also use the term "cho so do" which means they are "waiting for red certificate" after having submitted their application. It could be that there is a greater backlog in the issuance of BOLUCs in the north. It could also be that Saigonese are being looser in their claim of possessing the BOLUC while they are still waiting for its issuance. In any case, only in the north is the distinction so commonly made which again indicates a greater formal exactness with practices in Hanoi. We would expect to see some difference in the market value between those claiming they have the BOLUC and those that are waiting for it.
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There is one type of term that is commonly used in both the north and the south. "Giay to hop le" is a vague term which literally translated means "papers in accordance to regulation" or more loosely "legal papers". These papers include the variety of documents which can be used to apply for the pink certificate. There are also many derivations of this term used in the ads referring to specific legal papers such as building permits, the old housing permits, etc., but for the purposes of this study, all of these were grouped into a single "legal papers" category because the listers are mentioning them as some proof of ownership right but according to the law they have less standing than the pink certificate. Despite the differences in the scale of markets and histories, both cities' advertisements use this term with similar frequency: 22.5% in Hanoi, 23.9% in HCMC.
We see that while economic factors such as large potential gains from skyrocketing demand can provide incentives for a systemic change to private property rights, the vocabulary for the new private property rights in the two markets have evolved differently: "Pink certificate" and "ownership certificate" in the south and "red certificate" and "waiting for red certificate" in the north. These linguistic differences suggest different cultural perceptions about the law and property. This study next investigates whether these linguistic differences also have economic significance.
(b) Differences in market pricing of property rights
This study analyzed the data described in the previous section using a standard hedonic price model. The hedonic price model is basically a multi-linear regression model where the coefficients of the variables are interpreted as a portion of the house's market value (Box & Cox, 1964; Goodman & Kawai, 1984; Rosen, 1974) 9 . It is unusual to have sufficient data from a developing country to be able to apply the hedonic price model 10 . We are also fortunate to be able to enter property rights variables into the model to find their market value. Table 2 shows the result of the base models for Hanoi and HCMC. The models have a good fit with all the signs of the variables in the expected direction. Property prices generally fall the farther houses are located away from the city center and generally rise with more floor area, street frontage, and living amenities. The coefficients are also similar to those of a previous study of Ho Chi Minh City that used data from a different newspaper source, further indicating the robustness of the model (Kim, 2004) .
[Place Table 2 around here] However, the explanatory power of the HCMC models at R 2 = 0.586 is higher than for the Hanoi models at R 2 = 0.467. Furthermore, in the Hanoi model, the variable that measures the distance from the city center is insignificant, while having the appropriate sign. This variable is one of the most important characteristics that should appear in the urban land price patterns that has transitioned away from a centrally planned economy to a market system (Bertaud & Renaud, 1995) . By contrast, in HCMC's market, house prices decrease by 11.7% for every kilometer it is located away from the central business district (CBD). This could be in part because Hanoi is a smaller and denser city and thus distance could play less of an important role. As shown in Table 1 , most of the properties in Hanoi lie about four kilometers from the center with a standard deviation of only 1.72 kilometers whereas HCMC properties were typically five kilometers away with a standard deviation of 2.54 kilometers. And we do see that the variable fringeq is significantly negative indicating that prices do fall at Hanoi's urban fringe. Still, we would expect to find the market to value distance in a more gradated fashion.
In further comparing the base models of Hanoi and HCMC we also find some other important differences. One is that when city district dummies were entered in the Hanoi model to further account for a house's neighborhood value, only two of them were significant. Still, they were all included in the model because they increased its explanatory power. However, in the HCMC model, most district variables were significant commanding different premiums even after holding other location variables constant (whether they were in the CBD or city periphery and their distance from the CBD). The significance of the district dummy variables and of the distance to CBD variable indicates that Ho Chi Minh City's market values a property's location more sensitively than Hanoi's. One of the other observations we could make about the descriptive statistics in Table 1 is that Hanoian ads do not advertise their other locational attributes as much as in HCMC (such as proximity to schools and markets). The lower explanatory power of the Hanoi model and the insignificance of location variables suggest that Hanoi's housing market is still somewhat atypical of other markets. This coincides with the arguments made earlier about the differences in supply constraints and/or the market savvy social norms between Hanoi and HCMC.
The key variables of interest in this study surround property rights. As explained previously, laws and regulations about property rights are uniform nationally in Vietnam. But, we have observed differences in how lay terms used for property rights have evolved between the north and the south. Earlier I contend that the slowness to linguistic change in Hanoi about property is indicative of its society's receptiveness to economic transition in general. And now we investigate if they have statistical significance. Table 3 shows the results for Ho Chi Minh City and Table 4 shows the results for Hanoi. The property rights variables were entered step-wise to the base models in Table 2 . As we would expect, both Hanoi and HCMC models show that the seller who explicitly communicates possessing the BOLUC (a pink or red certificate) can ask the highest offer price. Hanoians can ask for a 7% premium while sellers in HCMC can ask around 11% more if they have already obtained the pink certificate. In HCMC, the vaguer term that was used more commonly only three years earlier, "ownership certificate", could no longer command as high a value as "pink certificate" at 4.3%.
[Place Table 3 and 4 around here] The most tell-tale indicator of significantly different operations of property rights between the two cities is in the case when more ambiguous terms are used. The two markets have opposite signs on the coefficients for the term "legal papers". In Hanoi, citing the possession of legal papers has a negative effect on offer prices. Sellers decrease the offer price by 9% if they mention these. Model 3 is included in the analysis to show that the claim of "waiting for the pink certificate" is not statistically significant to the 95th percentile. It appears that the Hanoian housing market is less tolerant of ambiguous property rights and the seller has internalized it into their initial offer price. However, Ho Chi Minh City is a different story. "Legal papers" is significantly positive and can still command a 7% premium over not advertising possession of any paper documentation of property rights. As one would expect, the coefficient is less than for the "pink certificate" but it is still valued as something between being fully titled and having no documentation.
INVESTIGATING ALTERNATIVE HYPOTHESES
The main finding of this model concerns how the two markets value "legal papers" over formal title; the coefficient is negative in Hanoi and positive in HCMC. The contention of this paper is that norms, socially constructed by political interests and culture, play a large part in accounting for this difference.
In considering other variables that could be in the error term, it could be that instead of the institutional environment, the properties with informal title in Hanoi are somehow different than those in HCMC. One hypothesis could be that such houses in Hanoi are of lower quality than in HCMC and that the legal papers variable is picking up the effect of lower valued housing. However, as the descriptive statistics showed, the amenities of the houses in the Hanoi sample are similar to the HCMC sample. Table 5 shows that there is no significant correlation between any of these amenities and the legal papers variable in either city except for having a landline telephone.
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[Place Table 5 around here] Alternatively, instead of the house itself, it could be that houses with informal property rights in Hanoi are located in neighborhoods with lower housing values than in HCMC. The percentage of low quality housing stock in the house's ward is positively and significantly correlated with legal papers in Hanoi while it is insignificant in HCMC. However, the percentage of low quality housing is not only very low but similar between the two cities. In examining the frequency distribution, within the 25 th and 75 th percentiles, the percentage of a ward's housing stock of low quality ranges from 2-6% in Hanoi and 0-5% in HCMC. So it must be some factor besides low quality housing in a ward that is decreasing the value of properties with legal papers in Hanoi.
Beyond housing and neighborhood characteristics, one might question if there is something structurally different about Hanoi's housing market. For example, the percentage of high quality housing in the Hanoi sample's wards is higher than in HCMC; 55-69% versus 14-36% between the 25 th and 75 th percentiles. One could hypothesize that because the percentage of high quality housing in a ward in the Hanoi sample is higher, the market might discriminate against properties with only legal papers instead of formal title. However, the negative correlation between the high housing quality variable and the legal papers variable in Hanoi is not significant.
Curiously, high housing quality is positively and significantly correlated with the legal papers variable in HCMC. This raises the question as to why the houses in nicer neighborhoods in HCMC are not getting the pink certificate. And, more importantly why is it not a liability in HCMC's market to offer legal papers like it is in Hanoi, given that the distribution of certificates are similarly backlogged in both cities. The data indicates that owners of high quality houses have other documentation of ownership but do not have the BOLUC. And with HCMC's market's pricing structure, they would lose only a 4% premium of having gone to the trouble of getting the certificate versus roughly a 16% differential in Hanoi.
This again leads to my argument about the importance of social norms and local enforcement institutions in shaping how property rights evolve. As one key informant explained, the benefit of buying property in HCMC without the pink certificate is worth the risk, especially if one is planning to resell it quickly because real estate prices have been rising rapidly. But, this classic Demsetzian explanation is only made possible through HCMC's particular institutional context. The economic benefit can be realized because it is normal for people to transact without the pink certificate in the market -it will not impede the sale. The benefit also exists because the property rights risks can be lowered with just legal papers because they are still recognized by the neighborhood block groups and ward levels of government.
In the north it must be expected to transact with some proof of property right because otherwise no seller would advertise legal papers if it would bring down their asking price. We see in Table 1 , nearly all the ads in Hanoi claim some sort of documentation. However, in the south, it seems that advertising legal papers is still better than offering nothing.
One problem in studying the market value of title involves endogeneity. While a title might add value to a property by increasing its property rights security and mortgageability, owners of more valuable properties might tend to pursue the cost and trouble of obtaining title to protect their asset. Endogeneity is not an overwhelming concern in this case for two reasons. First, the cost of titling appears to be either independent of or negatively correlated with the value of the property 12 . Second, a primary interest of the study is to examine the value of legal papers as a property right. Endogeneity with titling should not affect the coefficient on legal papers. The probability of a seller possessing legal papers is related to factors that are independent of a property's value.
WHY THE NORTH AND SOUTH DEVELOPED DIFFERENT WAYS OF OPERATIONALIZING AND PRICING PROPERTY RIGHTS: IMPLICATION OF FINDINGS
In light of the empirical findings, we can make several observations. This study took advantage of the natural experiment situation in which the same legal reforms were applied across the country. It also took advantage of the availability of data to employ a standard hedonic price model to find statistical evidence of variation in how formal legal reforms were adopted in two Vietnamese cities. The Demsetzian literature would have predicted a change to private property rights in Vietnam, only if one took an ecumenical view of institutions. As housing demand skyrocketed with transition, large economic gains could be achieved through a private housing market. But, it is the old communist institutions that helped to mitigate the startup and transaction costs involved in establishing a private property rights regime. The household registration system helped to establish stable and documented tenancy at the onset of transition therefore tenure security was not an impediment to the market. The neighborhood block groups and ward administrations increasingly took on the task of adjudicating property disputes, as they had already been involved in many household level economic matters and had better information about local residents and properties. Meanwhile, legislative reforms, title registration and cadastral survey institutions, courts, and the legal profession, institutions with high start-up costs, have been developing more slowly. One could argue that in the interim, the emergence of new private property rights took the most cost-effective path given Vietnam's institutional endowment of a communist bureaucracy. Although title was not well distributed and legal institutions are weak, the private housing market has taken off in both cities, beguiling international indicators that Vietnam has some of the most inappropriate private property rights institutions amongst all countries.
This study also finds that despite a centralized political system and the nation-wide legal reforms, property rights evolved differently in Vietnam's two leading cities. The cost-benefit model of institutional change is not only inadequate in explaining the process by which private property rights change but also the resulting forms and market value of new private property rights. While economic forces helped impel a change to private property, Hanoi's market has been slower to adopt changes and is less tolerant of legally ambiguous property rights than HCMC's despite the north's even greater level of housing demand. This paper argues that because government control and social norms are more rigid about following rules, property owners are penalized by the market for claiming "legal papers" or "waiting for pink certificate" instead of having the final certificate. In Hanoi's economy with a housing shortage we would have expected to see increased informality but the political economy and social norms shaped it otherwise. Meanwhile, in HCMC, the change to private property rights and a housing market were assisted by the social norms that encourages entrepreneurialism and pragmatism over legal formalism and local bureaucratic institutions that serve as unofficial enforcers of the new property rights. We found sellers could use a variety of forms and terms for property rights and the market could price the risks accordingly.
Market price data has been used here to show how local norms, socially constructed by the reciprocal relationship between political institutions and culture, shape economic transactions. The main point of this study is not that the two cities value formal titles. One would expect them to have market value, especially considering the investment in time and costs for the minority of households who obtained them. Rather, the major finding of this paper is that for the majority of households who do not have title, Hanoi's market values legally ambiguous property rights status as a liability whereas HCMC's market values it positively as an intermediary form of property right. The irony here for policy circles is that the looser, less lawrespecting norms about property rights have been an important part of the South's rapid investment into the housing market. In the current global trend to title housing, we should expect to see even greater variation in outcomes between countries with greater differences in social norms and political institutions.
Asia Commercial Bank that characterized their operations as taking deposits from the north and making loans in the south. 6 The definition of "private" firms in Vietnam include situations where those with political connections are often intimately tied to the ownership of these firms (Gainsborough) . Still, these organizations have been allowed to manage their daily operations, face a hard budget constraint, must be responsive to market demand, and do not enjoy the preferential treatment shown to state-owned real estate companies in terms of access to credit, land, and easier permitting and approvals. The literature finds that a similar gradated view of "private" exists in China as well ( ).
7 A multi-year data set would have been desirable. However, the archives for the Hanoi edition were destroyed in a flood so previous years issues were unavailable. 8 In Hanoi, the listers sometimes identify that they are chinh chu or "owner". Of these 336 ads, 190 further specify they have the red certificate and 24 specify that they are waiting for it. This paper tests the value of legal documentation and therefore the specific types of documents were entered into the model and not general claims of ownership.
9 For more detailed and technical discussion of the specification of the models used in this study, please refer to Kim, 2004. 10 A few studies have shown with hedonic price models that housing markets can distinguish and price the premium for legal tenure (Dowall & Leaf, 1991; Jimenez, 1984; Kim, 2004) .
11 This is not a major issue given that Vietnam has had explosive growth in cell phone usage. 12 For further details on the private costs of titling including tax liabilities, please refer to Kim, 2004 T-stats in parentheses. a = the correlation could not be calculated because the variable is constant.
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)
Appendix: Notes on the data
Assistants entered information from the newspaper listings. Only listings which provided the name of the property's ward were entered because socio-demographic variables could be attached to the observations. A complication is that since the 1999 census, the jurisdictional boundaries of some of the wards in the urban fringe areas were redrawn. For new wards that were completely within the boundaries of former wards, census data of the former wards were applied. Any questionable observations were removed.
The listed property prices came in two currencies. Prices in HCMC were usually quoted in gold luongs while most in Hanoi were quoted in millions of dong, the Vietnamese paper currency (see Table 1 ). All prices were converted into Vietnamese dong using the current official exchange rate taken from the newspaper for that particular date. I removed outlier observations that had prices less than 100 million VND and greater than 16,000 million VND.
Past hedonic price model studies of real estate have found certain variables consistently significant and large determinants of real estate values so it was important to have data for these variables in order to ensure explanatory power in the model. The variable Distance to CBD, was calculated by first identifying the property's ward. A geographical midpoint was inputted in GIS software for each ward's jurisdictional boundaries and then a straight-line distance was calculated from the ward's midpoint to the city's downtown central business district in kilometers. This number was rounded to the nearest whole kilometer.
A house's size, specified by Floor Area, is also a major determinant of price. Only ads which stated the square meter floor area of the house were collected. I removed outliers beyond two standard deviation for each city. In the end, 1631 observations were collected for Hanoi and 3537 observations for HCMC.
There are some drawbacks to this source of data.
We cannot see what the actual transaction prices are or whether they sell at all. Most probably, listed prices will tend to be inflated to allow room for negotiation. The prices may also be higher due to sample bias. The people who can afford to buy a classified advertisement may not represent the average market seller and may tend to list higher end properties. Is so, one could theorize that property rights is more important for this market segment than lower income households with less options. On the other hand, many of the listers are avoiding broker fees and therefore may be able to offer lower prices. So, in the interpretation of the findings, it is important to keep in mind that the findings apply to this market segment. Another possible problem is the variation amongst the sellers in terms of the expertise and knowledge they have about the market. I attempt to smooth out these biases by taking a large random sample to find variables that are consistently significant. Related to this, it is possible that a seller could possess legal papers or a certificate but not have advertised it in the listing. If this were the case however, the property rights coefficient would understate the effect of property rights on prices. In order to check how feasible the listings were as a data source, field assistants called listers to enquire about properties and found that the sellers were open to discussing properties and the form of tenure they had, inviting the assistants to come and see the documents and property. While we cannot substantiate their claim through this method, still we assume the sellers would not be able to maintain the offered price level when a buyer investigates the claim themselves. In any case, the thousands of listings made voluntarily by sellers in the newly emerged real estate markets provides a rich data source without the problems of survey instruments. What we can find are the sellers' perceptions of what they can ask for in the market and how property rights impact this. We are assuming supply is responsive to demand because of the large numbers of competitors and the free entry and exit into the market.
